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MAKING HORSES DRINK: CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE THEORY AND FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 502
Liesa L. Richter*
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was designed five years ago in response to
an outcry from lawyers, clients, and Congress about the escalating costs of
electronic discovery. The vast majority of these rising costs stems from
page-by-page attorney review of electronically stored information (ESI) for
privilege and work-product protection. This culture of painstaking eyes-on
privilege review is the offspring of traditional common law privilege and
waiver doctrine, which has the potential to punish any breach in
confidentiality with broad subject matter waiver extending well beyond the
original mistaken disclosure and inflicting irreparable damage on the
privilege holder’s litigation position. The specter of such damaging
privilege waivers has led to the tradition of expensive page-by-page preproduction review. In direct response to pleas for a change to common law
waiver doctrine to protect clients from such broad exposure and to allow
them to capitalize on the nature of ESI by facilitating technology-assisted
review, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence
undertook construction of a waiver rule for the twenty-first century.1 The
result was Federal Rule of Evidence 502.2
Having valiantly responded to the call for change, rulemakers anticipated
rapid adoption and robust use of the new waiver rule to minimize
expenditures associated with privilege review of ESI.3 Instead, Federal
Rule of Evidence 502 has been met with suspicion and resistance from the
very stakeholders that urged its adoption.4 Litigants continue to embrace
* Thomas P. Hester Presidential Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. I
would like to extend a special thanks to Dan Capra for allowing me to be part of such a
fascinating dialogue. I would also like to thank my colleague Steve Gensler for his helpful
insights into the Civil Rules.
1. See Panel Discussion, Reinvigorating Rule 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1533, 1535
(2013) (comments of the Honorable Sidney Fitzwater) (explaining that Rule 502 was
designed to address specific complaints regarding privilege review of ESI).
2. FED. R. EVID. 502.
3. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1544 (comments of the Honorable Paul
Grimm) (noting that “there was so much hope and expectation for what this rule would do”).
4. Id. at 1535 (comments of the Honorable Sidney Fitzwater) (“Rather than enjoying
rather robust usage, as had been anticipated, procedures and court orders permitted under
Rule 502 are implemented relatively infrequently.”); see also Edwin M. Buffmire, The
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traditional and costly eyes-on methodology in reviewing for privilege,
notwithstanding the opportunities provided by Rule 502 to utilize more
efficient and economical computer-assisted techniques. This Symposium
was designed to explore the reasons for underuse of Rule 502, as well as to
identify possible rulemaking and educational measures that may allow the
Rule to live up to its full potential.5
Back in 2007, prescient commentators identified three key challenges in
adapting litigation to the ESI era.6 First, new techniques needed to be
developed for the retrieval and review of ESI.7 Second, rules of privilege
needed to adapt to eliminate the dire consequences of inadvertent
disclosure.8 Third and finally, litigators needed to “embrace creative,
technological approaches to grappling with knowledge management,”
equating to “perhaps the biggest new skill set ever thrust upon the
profession” and a “revolution for the practice.”9 The first two challenges
have largely been met with sophisticated retrieval and review
methodologies and meaningful waiver protection in the form of Rule 502.
It appears that the third challenge presents a more formidable obstacle.
Lawyers steeped in the adversarial tradition and common law privilege
doctrine have yet to embrace fully the technology-assisted privilege review
that stands ready to preserve significant litigation resources.
In examining reasons for this phenomenon and the current
underutilization of Rule 502, “conceptual change theory” provides a useful
framework for identifying impediments to fuller implementation of the
Rule, as well as potential remedies. This theory, described by Cornell
researchers in the 1980s, highlights the process “by which people’s central,
organizing concepts change from one set of concepts to another set,
incompatible with the first.”10 Conceptual change theory posits that
dramatic conceptual change from longstanding and tenaciously followed
practices to inconsistent methodology can only be realized if there is
(1) data-supported dissatisfaction with the status quo and (2) data-supported
viable alternatives to the status quo.11
A shift from eyes-on privilege review methodology to computer-assisted
review that allows documents to be produced to an adversary without
lawyer review represents the very type of radical change unlikely to
(Unappreciated) Multidimensional Benefits of Rule 502(d): Why and How Litigants Should
Better Utilize the New Federal Rule of Evidence, 79 TENN. L. REV. 141, 141 (2011) (noting
that litigants “have been slow to adopt” 502 and the Rule “has not lived up to its promise”).
5. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1539 (comments of Professor Daniel J. Capra,
Moderator) (noting that the Symposium was designed to provide perspective about what can
be done to “energiz[e]” Rule 502).
6. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, at 2–3 (2007).
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. George J. Posner et al., Accommodation of a Scientific Conception: Toward a
Theory of Conceptual Change, 66 SCI. EDUC. 211, 211 (1982).
11. Id. at 213.
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transpire absent satisfaction of both steps in the conceptual change
process.12 Exploring Rule 502 in tandem with litigant incentives reveals
several potential impediments to conceptual change at each phase of the
process. For several reasons, there may be inadequate dissatisfaction with
the traditional eyes-on privilege review methodology to drive meaningful
change.
Further, litigants may not recognize technology-assisted
approaches to privilege review and “quick-peek” arrangements with
litigation adversaries as viable alternatives to the traditional model that
emphasizes confidentiality at all costs.
Part I of this Essay will briefly discuss the “default” provisions found in
Rule 502(a) and (b) and the contributions that those subsections of the Rule
have made to reforming costly privilege review. Part I will suggest that
these portions of the Rule have largely achieved their purpose and need not
be amended to bolster the effectiveness of Rule 502. Part II will focus on
the “self-help” provisions found in Rule 502(d) and (e). Increasing litigant
reliance on these provisions presents the best opportunity for Rule 502 to
achieve its initial goal of reducing prohibitive costs associated with ediscovery. Part II will highlight several impediments to party reliance on
these “self-help” provisions through the lens of conceptual change theory.
Finally, Part II suggests potential educational and rulemaking measures to
remove these impediments to adoption and to increase party reliance on
these cost-saving measures.
I. A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION:
THE “DEFAULT” PROVISIONS OF RULE 502
In taking stock of Rule 502, it is important to emphasize that subsections
(a) and (b) of the Rule have already made significant contributions to more
cost-effective privilege review of ESI. Rule 502(a) successfully curtails
concerns about subject matter waiver that may fuel wasteful expenditures
on privilege review and create leverage to settle otherwise defensible
lawsuits.13 Fear of subject matter waiver was repeatedly cited as a driving
force behind costly page-by-page privilege review during the public
hearings on Rule 502.14 Rule 502(a) eliminates the specter of broad and
damaging subject matter waivers arising out of inadvertent disclosures by
limiting subject matter waiver to instances of intentional selective
disclosure of privileged or protected information that creates unfairness to
the adversary.15
12. Id. at 212 (describing the radical form of conceptual change requiring replacement of
central commitments with incompatible principles as an “accommodation”).
13. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
14. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (identifying a purpose of the rule as
dealing with longstanding disputes over subject matter waiver). Such concerns also
animated the discussion of e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND COMMENTARY,
531–32 (2012 ed.).
15. FED. R. EVID. 502(a); see also GENSLER, supra note 14, at 531 (noting lawyer
complaints regarding broad subject matter waiver and describing the Rule 502(a) remedy).
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Rule 502(b) protects against inadvertent waivers associated with
mistaken disclosures by providing protection for parties that utilize
reasonable pre-production measures to prevent such accidental disclosures
and reasonable and prompt post-production measures to assert and preserve
The commentary to Rule 502(b) encourages judicial
privilege.16
recognition of technology-assisted review methodologies as reasonable.17
Therefore, Rule 502(b) has successfully brought a uniform standard to the
issue of inadvertent disclosure by clearly adopting a reasonableness
approach and clearly signaling in the Rule and commentary the demise of
the strict waiver or merciful “accidents won’t be punished” approaches.
Both Rule 502(a) and (b) extend protection against waiver to federal and
state proceedings, ensuring that a federal disclosure protected under the
Rule will remain protected in other federal or state proceedings.18 Rule
502(a) and (b) need not be affirmatively utilized by litigants to serve their
palliative purposes because they are default provisions that apply regardless
of any specialized use by the parties.19 Accordingly, there is no need to
encourage adoption or utilization of these provisions of the Rule.20
Notwithstanding the significant advances embodied in these provisions,
inconsistent judicial interpretation has undermined somewhat the
predictable protection Rule 502 was designed to create.21 Interpretive
difficulties have included questions over the meaning of “inadvertent”
production in 502(b). A few courts have suggested that a voluntary
production of a privileged document, even unwittingly, is not “inadvertent,”
thus reinserting the possibility of subject matter waiver for accidental
disclosures. Other courts have interpreted the term “inadvertent,” as
intended by the drafters of Rule 502, to coincide with the traditional
definition of “inadvertent” as meaning “mistaken” or “accidental.”22
Much more prevalent are differences in the interpretation of
“reasonableness” for purposes of Rule 502(b). Courts analyzing Rule
502(b) vary with respect to the level of pre-production effort necessary to
prevent a waiver, thus perpetuating some uncertainty for parties who
inadvertently disclose privileged information. Some courts appear to
maintain the wide-open forgiving standard that predated Rule 502 by
16. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
17. Id. advisory committee’s note (“[A] party that uses advanced analytical software
applications and linguistic tools in screening for privilege and work product may be found to
have taken ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent inadvertent disclosure.”).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a)–(b).
19. Of course, to serve their ultimate purpose of reducing the costs of privilege review,
parties must be aware of the existence and operation of Rule 502(a) and (b) in order to
design privilege review against the backdrop of protection they provide. Still, litigants need
not take affirmative steps in the course of discovery to trigger these protections.
20. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1539 (comments of Professor Daniel J. Capra,
Moderator) (noting that Rule 502(d) is the “foremost focus” of the Symposium).
21. See Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter, Federal Rule
of Evidence 502: Has it Lived Up to Its Potential?, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, at 63–78 (2011)
(detailing interpretive pitfalls in federal cases).
22. Id. at 29–33.
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focusing on the “interests of justice” instead of pre-production
precautions.23 Others appear to maintain a strict view, insisting on “all”
reasonable means to prevent disclosure.24 Still others appear to embrace
the middle ground approach embodied in Rule 502(b), but disagree as to
which steps are “reasonable” to prevent and rectify inadvertent disclosures.
Interpretive difficulties surround issues of reliance on outside document
review vendors, use of key word searches to locate potentially privileged
information, the size of a production, the deadline for a production, and
document retention policies.25
While educational measures could advance more uniform interpretation,
rulemaking action appears unnecessary with respect to Rule 502(a) and (b)
for three primary reasons. First, the commentary explaining the intent
behind these provisions is clear and instructive. Courts and litigants
consulting the legislative history of the rule should ultimately arrive at the
proper reasonableness calibration using the existing standard. Furthermore,
as judges become increasingly tech-savvy, attitudinal opposition to
computer-assisted review may diminish. Second, a “reasonableness”
approach is inherently variable and impossible to nail down with certainty
in rule text. In other words, the standard chosen as the optimal one
necessarily invites some interpretive flexibility that cannot be cured without
adopting a more bright-line standard. Third, and most importantly, Rule
502(a) and (b) represent the default waiver rules that apply to discovery
disclosures when parties have not planned in advance for waiver issues
during production of ESI. The “self-help” provisions found in subsections
(d) and (e) of Rule 502 are tailor-made to eliminate unpredictable
interpretive pitfalls.
Rule 502(d) and (e) have the potential to give litigants the control and
certainty they require by allowing them to request an order preventing
waiver of privilege as a result of disclosures to an adversary, irrespective of
the care taken in pre-production review.26 Such federal court orders are
binding in all other federal and state proceedings.27 Therefore, remaining
uncertainty in the default provisions can be avoided by affirmative litigant
use of Rule 502(d) and (e). Because these “self-help” provisions present
the best opportunity for litigants to create the predictability necessary to
23. Id. at 44 (discussing Rhoads Industries, Inc. v. Building Materials Corp. of America,
254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008), and the use of the “interests of justice” standard to interpret
502(b)).
24. Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 41–42 (noting that courts such as the one in Mt.
Hawley Insurance Co. v. Feldman Production, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125 (S.D. W. Va. 2010), “set
the bar quite high for what . . . a party must do to avoid a finding of unreasonableness”).
25. See Ann M. Murphy, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: The “Get Out Of Jail Free”
Provision—or Is It?, 41 N.M. L. REV. 193, 228–32 (2011) (comparing judicial approaches to
Rule 502(b) analysis).
26. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) & advisory committee’s note (the “court order may provide for
return of documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party.”);
FED. R. EVID. 502(e) & advisory committee’s note.
27. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (the “terms [of a 502(d) order] are
enforceable against non-parties in any federal or state proceeding.”).
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reduce e-discovery costs, educational and rulemaking efforts should be
directed toward resolving any obstacles to robust party use of these portions
of Rule 502.
II. THE “SELF-HELP” PROVISIONS OF RULE 502:
WHAT ARE THEY GOOD FOR?
Pursuant to Rule 502(e), litigants may enter “[a]n agreement on the effect
of disclosure [of privileged information] in a federal proceeding.”28 This
provision in the Evidence Rules complements Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(f), which directs litigants to develop a discovery plan and to
state the parties’ views and proposals on “any issues about claims of
privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials, including—if the
parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after production.”29
Using these provisions, litigation adversaries may agree to allow one
another to “claw back” inadvertently produced privileged or protected
documents, regardless of the care taken in pre-production review. Parties
may even elect to use a “quick-peek” arrangement whereby they agree to
produce documents with no pre-production review and to review for
privilege and work-product protection only after designation of documents
for use by the opposing side.30 Pursuant to such agreements, disclosure of
privileged or protected documents does not waive privilege or work product
protection as between the parties.31
While such agreements are helpful in binding the parties that are
signatories, they cannot offer protection against arguments of waiver made
by nonparties.32 For this reason, Rule 502(d) allows the parties to seek
entry of a federal court order providing that disclosures made in connection
with the litigation pending before the court will not result in any waiver of
the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, irrespective of the
care taken in pre-production review.33 Entry of such an order protects the
parties from a finding of waiver “in any other federal or state proceeding.”34
Therefore, it is the entry of a court order pursuant to Rule 502(d) that has
the power to provide the certain, predictable, and thorough protection to
litigants wishing to reduce the costs of e-discovery by eliminating privilege
review altogether or performing it through technology-assisted searches.
Although both the Evidence Rules and the Civil Procedure Rules clearly
contemplate party cooperation to address waiver issues, the commentary to
Rule 502 expressly provides that “[p]arty agreement should not be a
28. FED. R. EVID. 502(e).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(D).
30. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (“[T]he rule contemplates
enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and ‘quickpeek’ arrangements as a way to avoid the excessive
costs of pre-production review for privilege and work product.”); see also GENSLER, supra
note 14, at 558 (discussing “quick-peek” and “clawback” nonwaiver protocols).
31. FED. R. EVID. 502(e).
32. Id. (providing that agreement “is binding only on the parties to the agreement”).
33. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
34. Id.
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condition of enforceability of a federal court’s order.”35 Therefore, a court
may enter a Rule 502(d) order where the parties agree, at the request of one
party and over the objection of the other, or sua sponte absent party
request.36 Regardless of the method chosen, some stakeholder in the
federal litigation—either one of the parties or the trial judge—must
recognize the benefits of a 502(d) order and act affirmatively to construct
one. Notwithstanding that Rule 502 was enacted in 2008, courts and
litigants do not appear to be taking advantage of these “self-help”
provisions to the extent anticipated.37 In order to help Rule 502 achieve its
full potential, it is useful to explore why the provisions have not caught on
in order to identify rulemaking and educational measures that may increase
use of Rule 502(d) and (e).38
A. Lessons from Conceptual Change Theory
In analyzing reasons for the slow adoption of Rule 502’s “self-help”
provisions, “conceptual change theory” may be a useful construct to frame
and identify the problem.39 This theory, described by Cornell researchers in
the 1980s, highlights the process “by which people’s central, organizing
concepts change from one set of concepts to another set, incompatible with
the first.”40 Conceptual change theory delineates the steps by which the
“central commitments” that “define problems, indicate strategies for dealing
with them, and specify criteria for what counts as solutions” undergo

35. Id. advisory committee’s note (“Party agreement should not be a condition of
enforceability of a federal court’s order.”).
36. Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 59–60 (citing the Statement of Congressional Intent
accompanying Rule 502, 154 CONG. REC. 18,017 (2008), noting that a court may enter a
502(d) order on motion of one or more of the parties or “on its own motion”).
37. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
38. Scholars have suggested that merely persuading litigants to incorporate Rule 502(d)
orders into their discovery plans as a matter of course would represent a significant step
forward. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 145 (urging pro forma adoption of 502(d) orders);
see also Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1554 (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.) (“[W]e
negotiate 502(d) orders in every case. We do it as a best practice, because regardless of
whether we review or don’t review, the chances are that something is going to slip through
the filter.”). There can be little question that all rational parties should incorporate a 502(d)
order into their discovery plan given that 502(d) provides greater insurance against waiver
than the default standard embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b). Thus, litigants can
benefit from a 502(d) order even if they wish to maintain traditional attorney review for
privilege. To achieve the intended benefit of Rule 502, however, and to reduce wasteful
privilege review costs, parties must use the self-help provisions to cut privilege review costs
and not merely as additional protection in the context of traditional privilege review
methodology. There is merit to the concept of increasing use of 502(d) orders in the context
of traditional privilege review as a preliminary step toward eventual cutting of discovery
costs, however. If litigants become accustomed to incorporating 502(d) orders into their
discovery plans, they may slowly start to cut some privilege review corners after some
successful clawback experiences, ultimately advancing the goals of Rule 502. That said,
exploring impediments to the paradigm shift in privilege review methodology is crucial to
achieving the full benefit of Rule 502.
39. See Posner et al., supra note 10, at 211.
40. Id.
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modification.41 The most radical form of conceptual change, known as an
“accommodation,” requires one to “replace or reorganize” central
This form of conceptual change occurs when:
commitments.42
(1) “[c]entral concepts . . . have generated a class of problems which they
appear to lack the capacity to solve” and (2) when a “competing view . . .
appears to have the potential to solve these problems.”43 In other words,
dramatic conceptual change from long-standing and tenaciously followed
practices to inconsistent methodology can only be realized if there is:
(1) data-supported dissatisfaction with the status quo and (2) a datasupported viable alternative.44
The Rule 502 revolution, which encourages litigants to replace page-bypage privilege review with electronic, limited, or no privilege review prior
to production, constitutes the type of radical conceptual shift unlikely to
occur without data-driven dissatisfaction with traditional review and a datasupported viable alternative. Page-by-page privilege review started with
contemporary discovery and derives from longstanding common law rules
of privilege that demand maintenance of confidentiality to preserve
privilege.45 Without question, this is a time-honored and tenaciously
followed method of protecting privilege.46 Further, the scarring results of
the subject matter waiver and strict inadvertent waiver common law
standards helped to establish the stable privilege review methodology
practiced in the federal system for decades.47 Prior to enactment of Rule
502, an attorney who inadvertently disclosed a single privileged document
might suffer a waiver with respect to all other privileged documents within
the vaguely defined same “subject matter.”48 Even absent subject matter
waiver, an attorney who disclosed a privileged document inadvertently
could waive privilege with respect to the disclosed document itself,
potentially damaging the client’s litigation position in pending or future

41. Id. at 212.
42. This form of conceptual change is termed an “accommodation.” Id.
43. Id. at 213.
44. Id. at 212 (noting that learning “is best viewed as a process of conceptual change”
that is driven by the “available evidence”).
45. See Paul & Baron, supra note 6, at 17 (explaining that the modern free exchange of
discovery began in 1938 as a reaction to the former system in which “an attorney relied
primarily on her opponent’s pleading for discovery”).
46. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.28, at 379
(5th ed. 2012) (noting the common law rule that the “attorney-client privilege is waived by
the client’s voluntary disclosure of any significant part of the privileged communication or
matter in a nonprivileged setting”).
47. See Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in
the Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211,
213 (2006) (“Many courts . . . hold that when waiver is found . . . it covers not only the
document itself but also any communication dealing with the same subject matter. Thus,
counsel must carefully review all documents to assess the possible application of privilege or
work product protection.” (footnote omitted)).
48. Id. at 214 (noting that waiver could “extend to all communications on the same
subject matter”).
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cases.49 Traditional privilege review practices rely upon page-by-page
review of all produced documents to prevent such inadvertent disclosures
and corresponding waivers.50 Thus, page-by-page privilege review appears
to be the very type of ingrained practice that constitutes part of lawyers’
“theoretical hard core.”51
In contrast, Rule 502 encourages litigants to take advantage of the ESI
revolution and to utilize “advanced analytical software applications and
linguistic tools in screening for privilege and work product.”52 One
computerized review methodology that has been proposed to significantly
reduce discovery costs is “predictive coding.”53 This methodology is “a
type of computer-categorized review . . . that classifies documents
according to how well they match the concepts and terms in sample
documents.”54 It requires that attorneys review only samples of ESI for
privilege, as well as responsiveness and relevance. With input from the
attorneys with respect to this sample, the computer can score a large volume
of ESI as to relevance, responsiveness, and privilege. Lawyers again
review small sets of scored data to assess the accuracy of the scores, thus
refining the search and teaching the computer to score more accurately.55
While this method involves eyes-on review of small samples of ESI, it
significantly decreases lawyer time by relying upon computer learning and
computer-generated decisions about privilege. Rule 502(d) was designed to
allow reliance on methods like predictive coding to achieve savings with
confidence that computer error, should it occur, will not waive privilege.
Further, Rule 502(d) was intended to permit parties to forego preproduction privilege review altogether in appropriate cases through “quickpeek” arrangements whereby review for privilege is postponed until after
production to an adversary.56 Adoption of quick-peek arrangements or
predictive coding techniques requires a true paradigm shift from one of
preserving confidentiality at all costs to one that accepts the potential
sharing of privileged information with the adversary. Such a seismic shift
in privilege theory appears unlikely to be embraced absent data-driven
dissatisfaction with traditional eyes-on privilege review and a datasupported viable alternative upon which litigants can depend. As discussed
below, both of these steps necessary for conceptual change may present
obstacles to the swift abandonment of traditional privilege-review practice.
49. Id. at 213 (inadvertent or unintentional disclosure results in waiver).
50. Id.
51. Posner et al., supra note 10, at 212 (describing the central commitments that define
problems and identify strategies for dealing with them as part of the “theoretical hard core”).
52. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.
53. NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE
MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY, at xvii (2012) (describing predictive coding as a method that would “achieve
substantial savings in producing massive amounts of electronic information” by letting
“computers do the heavy lifting for review”).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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B. Lawyers As the 502 Gatekeepers: Satisfaction with
the Privilege Review Status Quo
The first step to conceptual change involves dissatisfaction with the
status quo. Before a radical conceptual change can occur, the prevailing
theory must generate dissatisfaction due to its inability to solve a class of
problems it was designed to address.57 When it comes to using Rule 502(d)
to abandon traditional privilege review, the question becomes whether the
traditional central commitment to eyes-on privilege review has generated a
class of problems that it cannot solve.
Ample data has been collected regarding the prohibitive costs of eyes-on
privilege review of massive amounts of ESI preserved for litigation that
may be discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.58 A
presentation by Verizon at the 2007 public hearings on Rule 502 revealed a
shocking $13.5 million in outside privilege review expenditures for a single
piece of litigation.59 Recent studies suggest that at least 70 percent of ESI
discovery costs are generated by the pre-production review process.60 This
data and other examples explored by the Advisory Committee and welldocumented in federal cases demonstrate that the advent of ESI discovery
has generated prohibitive costs that cannot be controlled using traditional
privilege review methodology, at least in some cases.61 This data
notwithstanding, there may be inadequate attorney dissatisfaction with
traditional privilege review to drive conceptual change for several reasons.
First, it may be that the type of case in which the traditional model truly
no longer functions remains relatively rare in an individual attorney’s
practice. There may be a sizeable number of cases where there is limited
ESI discovery. Even in cases involving extensive discovery of ESI,
significant pre-production review expenditures may be eclipsed by the

57. Posner et al., supra note 10, at 213 (“Central concepts are likely to be rejected when
they have generated a class of problems which they appear to lack the capacity to solve.”).
58. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“It responds to the widespread
complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of attorney-client privilege
or work product have become prohibitive.”); PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xiii (“[I]n
recent years, claims have been made that the societal shift from paper documents to [ESI]
has led to sharper increases in discovery costs than in the overall cost of litigation.”); Broun
& Capra, supra note 47, at 213 (noting that litigation involving voluminous documents is a
“harrowing and enormously expensive business”).
59. See Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 86–88 (Jan. 29 2007)
[hereinafter New York Hearing], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rulesand
Policies/rules/2007-01-29-Evidence-Minutes-Transcript.pdf (testimony of Patrick Oot,
Director of Electronic Discovery & Senior Counsel, Verizon). Total review costs for the
litigation exceeded $11 million. Id.
60. PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xiv (noting that “the major cost component in
our cases was the review of documents for relevance, responsiveness, and privilege
(typically about 73 percent)”).
61. Id. at xx (computer-review is “the only reasonable way to handle large-scale
production”).
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amount at stake for the producing party.62 Although the high absolute
dollar amount expended in pre-production privilege review in the federal
courts may represent a systemic failure, there may be inadequate
dissatisfaction with traditional privilege review methodology among
individual litigants to drive systemic change through the individual
decision-making necessary to utilize Rule 502. Where lawyers can depend
upon page-by-page review in many cases, they may be unwilling to explore
alternatives in the fraction of cases where computer-assisted review would
be warranted.
Second, even in cases involving significant and costly ESI production,
other available mechanisms may operate to preserve the perceived viability
of traditional privilege review. The e-discovery amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure limit discovery of ESI that is “not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”63 These amendments narrow
the field of ESI requiring privilege review. In addition, the Civil Procedure
Rules require judges to limit the extent of discovery when “the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues.”64 Further, judges have the authority to
control prohibitive discovery costs by requiring phased discovery at certain
times or in a particular sequence.65 Parties can also seek protection from
undue discovery burdens in the form of a protective order under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). These discretionary powers within the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a trial judge to prevent the type of
ESI discovery that would truly cost more than the amount in controversy
and may serve to maintain the viability of traditional privilege review.
In addition, other measures may be used to preserve traditional privilege
review methods. Law firms may hire temporary contract attorneys to
perform initial review of ESI at discounted rates. Of course, litigants may
always avoid excessive expenditures on pre-production privilege review
through settlement. To be sure, the costs of traditional privilege review
may inflate the settlement value of a case to the producing party and one of
62. See New York Hearing, supra note 59, at 88 (testimony of Patrick Oot) (explaining
that, for Verizon matters with privilege review costs in the millions, the amount at stake for
the company is around $20 million).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); see also GENSLER, supra note 14, at 534 (discussing
the importance of proportionality limits on the fair and efficient operation of the discovery
rules).
65. See GENSLER, supra note 14, at 536 (“[T]he court can structure the order of
discovery to ensure that the parties gather the ‘low-hanging fruit’ first, taking discovery from
the most important or the most accessible sources before determining whether there is any
need to cast the discovery net more widely.”). Judge Grimm’s standard discovery order
circulated to Symposium participants represents an excellent example of such proactive
judicial discovery management that serves to minimize wasteful discovery and privilege
review (on file with author). See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1572–73 (comments of
the Honorable Paul Grimm) (discussing his standard case management order).
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the goals of Rule 502 was to eliminate such e-discovery settlement
leverage.66 While a settlement may ultimately cost the producing party
more than technology-assisted review would have, lawyers who perceive
significant unquantifiable risk associated with production of privileged
materials may find a concrete settlement to be a superior alternative to
producing materials without eyes-on review. With these tools in their
arsenal to avoid spending amounts on privilege review unjustified by the
amount at stake in a particular case, litigants may perceive that traditional
eyes-on privilege review remains viable.
Third, even data showing $13.5 million spent on outside privilege review
in a single piece of litigation may not generate the requisite dissatisfaction
with the existing privilege review model to drive change. To be sure, such
cases may create client dissatisfaction with the current method and cost of
privilege review, depending on the overall value of the litigation, and
systemic dysfunction due to potentially wasteful expenditures on privilege
review. Still, client economic waste and client dissatisfaction represent
only one side of the coin.67 The other side of the coin represents the outside
law firms that billed such a staggering amount for privilege review.
Privilege review “sticker shock” may not necessarily lead to widespread
attorney dissatisfaction with the traditional model, and it is largely attorney
dissatisfaction that is necessary to drive a conceptual change in the
traditional privilege review model. The outside attorneys who represent
clients engaged in massive e-discovery are typically the gatekeepers to the
use of vehicles such as Rule 502(d) to truncate privilege review and cut
costs. In-house counsel at large institutional clients also drive such
decisions to some extent, but often rely on the advice of outside counsel to
make recommendations about overarching decisions like those involving a
discovery plan.68 Utilizing Rule 502(d) to limit attorney privilege review in
a case involving large-scale ESI production requires reliance on outside
document review vendors to do the software search necessary to perform an
electronic review.69 A dramatic paradigm shift to this form of privilege
review alone involves outsourcing a staple component of law firm business
to the technology industry.70
At a time when the legal market has suffered considerably as a result of
the downturn in the economy, swift adoption of a measure that further
66. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 154.
67. Of course, the cost-benefit analysis of privilege review costs from the client’s
perspective requires assessment of the value of the interests at stake in the instant litigation
and any subsequent litigation on related matters.
68. While it appears that some organizational clients are becoming more involved in
discovery planning, there remains a great deal of reliance on outside counsel in directing the
“review” phase of the discovery process. PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xiv (noting that
review of ESI remains “largely the domain of outside counsel”).
69. Id. at xv, tbl. S.1 (demonstrating that outside vendors take primary responsibility for
the collection and processing phases of e-discovery).
70. Id. at xvii–xviii (discussing significant cost savings achieved through replacement of
eyes-on review of all ESI pre-production with a method relying heavily on “predictive
coding” and eyes-on review of small samples).
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minimizes the need for attorney billable hours in litigation may be a tough
pill to swallow.71 Although attorneys will undoubtedly need to consult with
document review vendors as a component of ESI review, they may be
unwilling to outsource this function entirely through reliance on Rule
502(d).72 Notwithstanding their professional role, lawyers are human
beings and it may be unrealistic to expect them to serve as the spear-carriers
for the Rule 502(d) revolution to their own financial detriment. While most
lawyers will not consciously pursue inefficient methods for selfish reasons,
it is noteworthy that the Rule 502 “self-help” provisions ask attorneys to
make the choice that may cut against self-interest for the overall benefit of
clients and the system.
Billable-hour incentives aside, lawyers may legitimately fear ethical
sanctions or malpractice liability as a result of inadequate pre-production
privilege review, further maintaining satisfaction with traditional
methodology.73 While malpractice liability and ethical sanctions may be
available for breaches in client confidentiality occasioned by shoddy
privilege review practices, it is difficult to imagine such consequences for
excessive privilege review expenditures.74 Indeed, some courts have
deemed technology-assisted review procedures “unreasonable” in
considering inadvertent production under Rule 502(b).75 Conversely, it
seems implausible that a client could demonstrate certain harm from overreview absent extreme circumstances involving smoking gun evidence of
file churning. In other words, the safe and traditional choice from a lawyer
exposure standpoint is also the most lucrative one.76

71. Id. at 46 (“Recent economic woes, along with rising numbers of law school
graduates, have indeed produced a glut of attorneys, many of whom have found themselves
in a situation in which contracted review has become one of the few viable options for
maintaining a steady income stream.”).
72. Id. at xix (noting that “[a]nother barrier to widespread use [of electronic review of
ESI] could well be resistance to the idea from outside counsel, who would stand to lose a
historical revenue stream.”).
73. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1555 (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.)
(“[T]here is an inbred reluctance to say that what would have been five years ago the gross
negligence of not looking for privileged documents before they were produced is now a getout-of-jail-free card . . . . and it’s especially hard when the client is a lawyer . . . brought up
to believe that waiving a privilege was . . . maybe the worst thing you could do as a
lawyer.”).
74. See Murphy, supra note 25, at 233 (discussing the ethical obligation to maintain
client confidentiality under ABA Model Rule 1.6 and possible malpractice liability for
disclosure of privileged documents). See generally Paula Schaefer, The Future of
Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need To Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD.
L. REV. 195 (2010).
75. See Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 36–38 (discussing the Mt. Hawley case and
noting that “[i]f courts find waiver in cases where parties use computer analytical tools
properly, . . . lawyers and clients never will transition away from the burdensome and very
expensive [privilege review] methods”).
76. See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xix (“Few lawyers would want to be placed
in the uncomfortable position of having to argue that a predictive coding strategy reflects
reasonable precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, overproduction, or
underproduction, especially when no one else seems to be using it.”).
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Against this backdrop of incentives, it would be irrational for lawyers to
flock to use Rule 502(d) to dispense with traditional privilege review.
Indeed, the negligence standard is specifically set to require actors to take
into account societal interests in establishing a standard of care, rather than
purely selfish considerations.77 In order to achieve efficient levels of
protection for all, liability attaches to the selfish choice if it fails to account
for other values. Companies are typically required to spend resources to
ensure societally optimal safety. The incentives for lawyers in connection
with adoption of Rule 502(d) to minimize e-discovery costs are currently
calibrated in the opposite direction. The more they charge to conduct
painstaking eyes-on privilege review for the protection of client
confidentiality, the less likely they are to suffer ethical sanctions or
malpractice liability. Such concerns may be instrumental in maintaining
lawyer satisfaction with traditional privilege review, notwithstanding
mounting costs.
In light of the foregoing realities, it appears that it will take client
dissatisfaction with traditional privilege review methodology to drive
conceptual change toward a Rule 502(d) model. As the stakeholders with
the most to gain from computer-assisted review of ESI, clients awarding
business to lawyers based upon a sliding scale of cost and skill must push
attorneys toward change. Once clients become dissatisfied with traditional
privilege review, law firms will be forced to compete for business through
adoption of cheaper alternatives aided by the Rule 502 “self-help”
provisions. Indeed, pressure from clients to reduce discovery costs has
already been brought to bear. Recent downturns in the economy have led to
client demands for lower rates and law firms have had to respond to avoid
losing business.78 Such pressure has not necessarily led to abandonment of
page-by-page privilege review, however. Some firms have responded with
efforts to bring cheaper review alternatives in-house, developing internal
document review centers, employing IT professionals, as well as less
expensive contract lawyers to provide large-scale ESI review at lower cost
to clients.79 So long as clients remain satisfied with the costs associated
with review methodologies like these, law firms are unlikely to pursue lesscostly alternatives.
Additional education may be necessary to generate client dissatisfaction
with existing privilege review techniques that remain significantly more
expensive than the technology-assisted review made possible through Rule
502. Conferences and publications like this Symposium may be critical in
77. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (“Where an act is one
which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is
unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the
law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.”).
78. Changes in the economic climate for lawyers may drive this type of competition. See
PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at 39 (noting that “recent economic conditions” have
resulted in “significant changes in . . . financial relationships with outside counsel” and
noting “[p]ressure” from clients to reduce costs).
79. Id. at 41–55.
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educating institutional clients who can be expected to consume such
materials.80 Including client representatives in scheduling conferences
where they may gain exposure to cost-saving options and influence counsel
to make a client-centered choice may also generate greater dissatisfaction
with current privilege review methods. While this may not be a viable
option for cases involving individual clients, it is certainly workable in
federal litigation involving organizational clients served by sophisticated inhouse counsel and executives. It is in these cases involving organizational
clients that the prospect of extensive e-discovery is most pronounced.81 To
the extent that such increased client education causes some firms to begin
competing for business by utilizing Rule 502(d) and touting reduced
discovery costs, this change could drive the broader legal market to
embrace such measures.
Before lawyers will utilize technology-assisted privilege review to
compete for and retain clients, however, reliable protection from ethical
sanctions and malpractice liability must be in place. This could involve
alteration in ethical standards to account for disclosure without review.82
Such changes to ethical standards and to prevailing privilege review
practice could also serve to minimize malpractice exposure for disclosures
without review. In addition, guidelines governing the adoption of such
methods could encourage lawyers to utilize technology-assisted review
techniques. Technology-assisted review guidelines could instruct lawyers
to engage in a colloquy with a client regarding the costs and benefits of
various ESI review options. Much like physicians in the context of
informed consent, lawyers should allow clients to select the review
methodology most consistent with client goals in a given case.83 With
express and informed client consent, attorneys would be largely insulated
from ethical or malpractice exposure as a result of selected privilege review
techniques.
Finally, some potential for malpractice liability or ethical sanctions for
needlessly spending on privilege review would drive lawyers toward greater
use of Rule 502(d) methods. In light of longstanding waiver law and
80. Id. at 36–37 (noting that “in e-discovery generally, the interests of in-house counsel
and their external law firm colleagues may not always be in precise alignment, with the
potential for billing opportunities for review resulting in the law firms . . . viewing the
company’s litigation demands as lucrative ‘cash cows,’ with each new e-discovery demand
seen as ‘a bird’s nest on the ground.’”); id. at 38 (noting that allowing outside counsel to
handle vendor choices for collection of ESI is not the most “cost-effective” approach).
81. As was pointed out during the Symposium, many of the institutional “clients” are
themselves lawyers who may share the traditional attorney concerns with truncated privilege
review discussed above. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1554 (noting that the “client” is
often a lawyer) (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.).
82. See generally Murphy, supra note 25.
83. See Schaefer, supra note 74, at 247–49 (discussing proposed amendments to ethical
rules requiring counsel to communicate with clients regarding privilege review protocol to
be used to prevent disclosures). See generally Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d
186 (Minn. 1958) (describing a doctor’s duty to explain available alternatives to a patient to
facilitate the patient’s choice and assessment of risk).
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traditional privilege review methodology, it may be impossible currently to
prevail in a malpractice case arguing that a lawyer excessively reviewed a
production for privilege. As clients drive the culture of privilege review
toward technology-assisted review, the possibility of sanction for failure to
offer such a cost-saving option could develop to further incentivize attorney
reliance on Rule 502(d). Much like a doctor who would be liable for failure
to inform a patient of a viable healthcare alternative, lawyers could be held
responsible for failing to alert clients to technology-assisted alternatives
made possible by 502(d). In sum, existing data, methods, and incentives
may be inadequate to generate widespread dissatisfaction with the
traditional method of page-by-page privilege review among the lawyers
who largely drive the use of Rule 502(d). This lack of attorney-based
dissatisfaction with traditional privilege review may serve as a significant
impediment to conceptual change. Client education and demand appears
most likely to drive attorney adoption of this option, alongside protections
from ethical and malpractice exposure.
C. Does a Rule 502(d) Order Provide a “Viable” Alternative to
Traditional Privilege Review?
Attorneys who fail to recommend less expensive electronic privilege
review through use of a Rule 502(d) order are likely not motivated purely
by greed and fear. The second critical component of radical conceptual
change demands an “intelligible” and “plausible” alternative paradigm that
can readily replace the traditional model that is no longer functioning
optimally.84 In other words, lawyers must be able to grasp the operation of
a 502(d) order and to appreciate its ability to resolve the existing problems
of expensive privilege review. Due to ambiguities created by the
overlapping authority of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence in this area, litigants may not have a firm grasp
on the operation of the “self-help” provisions of Rule 502. Further, to truly
change the nature of traditional privilege review and reduce costs
accordingly, attorneys and litigants must perceive documented success in
utilizing Rule 502(d). Where attorneys have yet to observe documented
savings and success through the use of quick-peek and clawback
arrangements, they may not perceive the viable alternative to traditional
privilege review necessary to drive conceptual change.
1. Visibility of Evidence Rules
First, lawyers and judges may remain unaware of the self-help features of
Rule 502(d) and (e), notwithstanding their enactment over four years ago,
because of their placement in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Judges and
lawyers engaged in discovery planning and practice at the federal level
rightly consider the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the discovery “Bible.”
84. See Posner et al., supra note 10, at 214.
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Indeed, Rule 502 was enacted as a supplement to the e-discovery
amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to make the clawback
arrangement outlined therein protected from findings of privilege waiver.85
Because those amendments predated Rule 502, they could not contain a
reference to the evidentiary provision. Lawyers engaged in civil discovery
rarely consult their evidence rules to determine their rights and obligations,
and the same may be said of district and magistrate judges. In sum, many
lawyers, litigants, and judges may not be aware of the existence of the Rule
502(d) and (e) alternatives. This obstacle to conceptual change could be
easily remedied through both rulemaking and education. As has been
suggested by commentators, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be
amended to add a specific reference to Rule 502.86 This amendment would
create prominent visibility in the resource most likely to be consulted in the
discovery process, and it seems advisable in order to make the interaction
between discovery procedures and evidentiary protections clear and
accessible.
There are several possibilities for the placement of a Rule 502 reference
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26(f)(3)(D) governing
discovery plans could be amended to specifically direct the parties to
address a potential 502(e) agreement regarding privilege review and waiver,
as well as their desire for a Rule 502(d) order in their discovery plan. This
would direct lawyers unaware of the protection afforded by Rule 502 to
their Evidence Rules to investigate. Amendment of Rule 16(b)(3)(B) to
include a Rule 502(d) order as a feature that judges “may” incorporate into
a scheduling order also seems advisable.87 Although the current version of
Rule 16 directs courts to consider including party “agreements” with
respect to the assertion of privilege, it does not expressly contemplate a sua
sponte or contested order covering the same issues. Focusing the trial judge
on the possibility of a court-driven measure also seems likely to increase
use of Rule 502(d) orders. There could obviously be an educational
component to overcoming any 502 information-gap as well. Educating
district and magistrate judges about the benefits of Rule 502(d) and (e) for
effective case management could encourage judges to utilize them sua
sponte or to push parties to consider such arrangements supported by a
court order.

85. See GENSLER, supra note 14, at 531 (describing the origins of Rule 502 as part of ediscovery amendments to the FRCP).
86. See, e.g., Buffmire, supra note 4, at 146 (proposing amendment to FRCP 26(f)).
Importantly, the FRCP already references Evidence Rules when there is a relevant
interaction, which may create an expectation that the FRCP will point to the FRE where
pertinent. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A) (citing Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703,
and 705).
87. See Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 73 (noting that a federal judge may include a
clawback provision in a Rule 16 scheduling order).
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2. Rule 502(d) Standard
Second, even if litigants are aware that the “self-help” provisions in Rule
502(d) and (e) exist, they may be uncertain as to how they fit into the
detailed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure framework governing discovery
and as to the standards applicable to invoke them. Again, this potential
obstacle to the use of Rule 502 stems from the interaction between the Civil
Procedure Rules and the Evidence Rules. For the “self-help” provisions of
Rule 502 to protect parties from waiver in other litigation, the court must
enter an order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d).88 Litigants and
judges engaged in discovery planning are accustomed to utilizing court
orders to deal with discovery issues under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and may be unclear as to where in that framework the Rule
502(d) order fits. In that context, courts enter scheduling orders under Rule
16(b). Under Rule 16(b)(3)(B), judges may include in such scheduling
orders “any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or
of protection as trial-preparation material after information is produced.”89
Due to the explicit reference to privilege issues, a Rule 16 order may seem
the best vehicle for creating Rule 502(d) protection. Even assuming Rule
16 represents the proper vehicle, the standard applicable to a court’s
decision to grant such protection in any given case remains unclear. On one
hand, the language of Rule 16(b)(3)(B) may suggest that trial judges should
include a Rule 502(e) agreement in a scheduling order automatically
without any additional findings by the trial judge or showing by the parties.
On the other hand, Rule 16(b) specifically provides that trial judges “may”
include such items in the scheduling order and that they are “permissive”
rather than “required.”90 This may suggest that the trial judge retains
discretion to enter a Rule 502(d) order as part of a scheduling order, but
Rule 502(d) fails to provide a clear standard for exercising that discretion.91
Furthermore, Rule 16(b) specifically describes only situations in which the
parties reach an “agreement” as to privilege protection and waiver.92 The
Advisory Committee notes to Rule 502(d) make clear that courts have the
power to enter an order protecting the parties from waiver even in the
88. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
90. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A) (stipulating items that “must” be included in a
scheduling order), with FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B) (outlining the contents of a scheduling
order that are merely “permitted”).
91. Even assuming a liberal standard for an initial decision to include a nonwaiver
agreement as part of a scheduling order, modification of a scheduling order to add a
nonwaiver order requires “good cause.” See Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 60 (noting that a
court may modify a scheduling order to limit waiver for “good cause” pursuant to FRCP
16(b)(4)).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3) (requiring parties to develop a discovery plan and to “state
the parties’ views and proposals on . . . any issues about claims of privilege or of protection
as trial preparation materials, including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these
claims after production—whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order.”).
It is at this Rule 26(f) conference and during the development of a discovery plan that parties
must explore the possibility of a Rule 502(e) agreement.
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absence of party agreement, but are silent as to the standard a trial judge
should use in deciding to enter such an order without party consent.93
On the other hand, the commentary to Rule 502 discusses entry of a
“confidentiality order,” which may seem to point to entry of a “protective
order” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).94 Indeed, one of the
aims of this Symposium was to create a model “protective order” to guide
litigants seeking to utilize Rule 502(d).95 Protective orders are designed to
protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense.”96 A 502(d) order is most certainly directed at
protecting a party from “undue burden” and “expense.”97 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require “good cause” to support entry of a
protective order, however, and the party seeking such an order bears the
burden of demonstrating such “good cause.”98 Courts and litigants may
legitimately expect that a “good cause” standard applies to entry of a
contested or sua sponte order under Rule 502(d) and that such protection
will not be freely given absent the requisite showing.
In Rajala v. McGuire Woods,99 the court utilized a “good cause” standard
pursuant to Rule 26(c) in granting an opposed request for a Rule 502(d)
order.100 In that case, the defendant law firm successfully argued that an
order protecting against waiver was “necessary” due to extensive ESI
production and the high volume of client confidences contained in firm
Where Rule 502(d) is silent with respect to a controlling
records.101
standard, judges and litigants may legitimately expect that a Rule 502(d)
order should only be granted upon a showing of “good cause.” Although
some commentators have suggested the use of a Rule 502(d) order as a
standard best practice in every federal case, judges and litigants may
hesitate to utilize Rule 502(d) absent some compelling and demonstrable
case-specific need.102
93. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) (“A federal court may order that the privilege or protection is
not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court—in which
event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.”); see also
id. advisory committee’s note (“Party agreement should not be a condition of enforceability
of a federal court’s order.”).
94. Id. advisory committee’s note (describing a 502(d) order as a “confidentiality
order”).
95. See generally Model Draft of a Rule 502(d) Order, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587
(2013); see also Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 69 (Rule 502 encourages courts “to approve
such agreements by issuing a protective order if requested to do so, or on their own
volition.”).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
97. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (identifying one purpose being to
prevent wasteful privilege review costs).
98. See GENSLER, supra note 14, at 559–60 (noting that “[a] party seeking a protective
order may not rely on vague or speculative claims of such harm but instead must give
specific reasons and facts supporting the protective order.”).
99. No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010).
100. Id. at *6.
101. Id. at *2.
102. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 172 (suggesting the routine use of Rule 502(d)
orders).
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Conversely, litigants that have an agreement or a protective order in place
that addresses inadvertent disclosure and waiver may expect that they are
protected under Rule 502 even absent express reference to the evidentiary
rule. Judicial refusal to uphold waiver protection under such circumstances
undermines the viability of the Rule 502(d) order as an alternative to
traditional privilege review. Litigants, uncertain as to the magic words
necessary to invoke meaningful 502(d) protection, may reject it as a reliable
solution to costly pre-production privilege review.103 In sum, the necessity
of having waiver protection embodied in the Evidence Rules separate and
apart from the discovery framework outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure may create uncertainties regarding the procedures, standards, and
terminology necessary to invoke the protection. Such uncertainties may
undermine the perceived viability of limited privilege review as an
alternative to traditional lawyer review. Without a viable alternative that
lawyers can readily grasp and access, conceptual change theory suggests
that they will cling to their central commitment to traditional privilege
review practices.
This barrier to conceptual change can be remedied through amendments
to either or both the Civil Procedure Rules and the Evidence Rules. Due to
the need for congressional alteration of Rule 502, an amendment to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seems more plausible.104 If the intent of
Rule 502(d) is to vest the trial judge with broad authority to enter a
nonwaiver order in any case where she deems it appropriate without “good
cause” or other particularized findings—whether it is agreed upon, opposed,
or ignored by the parties, an amendment to Rule 16(b)(3)(B) appears most
appropriate. The amendment could allow trial judges to “include an order
pursuant to Rule 502(d) protecting the parties from a finding of waiver of
privilege or work product protection, irrespective of the care taken in preproduction review.”
Where Rule 16(b)(3)(B) confers upon trial judges “clear authority to
enter comprehensive scheduling orders addressing the timing and conduct
of virtually any aspect of the pretrial phase of the case,”105 placement of an
express reference to Rule 502(d) in that provision of the Civil Rules should
103. See, e.g., Cmty. Bank v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1:08-cv-01443-WTL-JMS,
2010 WL 1435368, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 8, 2010) (rejecting counsel agreement documented
in correspondence concerning the return of inadvertently produced documents as
insufficiently formal to bind the parties); Luna Gaming-San Diego, L.L.C. v. Dorsey &
Whitney L.L.P., No. 06cv2804 BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13,
2010) (finding a waiver of privilege through inadvertent disclosure notwithstanding a
protective order providing that such disclosures “shall not constitute a waiver of any
privilege”); Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., No. CV06-607-HU, 2008 WL 5122828, at
*3–4 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008) (ignoring a protective order in finding waiver of privilege).
104. Whether an amendment to clarify the standard for entering a nonwaiver order
constitutes a “privilege” amendment that must go through Congress is beyond the scope of
this Essay. It appears likely, however, that the original authority granted in 502(d) may be a
sufficient congressional blessing and that a clarification of the standard remains well within
the purview of the FRCP.
105. GENSLER, supra note 14, at 328.
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signal to courts and litigants when to consider a Rule 502(d) order, as well
as the broad discretionary standard applicable to its entry. To the extent
that there could be continuing uncertainty, committee notes to the
amendment could expressly clarify that such an order is purely at the
discretion of the court and requires no particularized showing from the
litigants. Further, reference to a “Rule 502(d) order” in Rule 16 could lead
judges to make express reference to the evidentiary protection in styling
scheduling orders, thus eliminating ambiguity with respect to the applicable
authority for the waiver protection.
Conversely, to the extent that the intent of Rule 502(d) is to treat such an
order like a protective order given its purpose to protect from undue burden
and expense, an alternative amendment could be made to Rule 26(c). Such
an amendment could clarify that courts should enter Rule 502(d) orders
pursuant to the authority granted to them therein and using the wellrecognized “good cause” standard to choose the cases in which to allow
them. Regardless of the standard adopted, courts and litigants would
receive clearer direction as to how the Rule 502(d) order fits into the
complex discovery framework of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. The Rule 502(d) Endgame
Another obstacle to the perceived viability of reduced privilege review
may be concern about the “endgame” with a 502(d) order in place. At some
point in the pretrial phase, parties need certainty that they may utilize the
materials produced by an adversary in preparing a case for trial. To be
certain, many ESI-heavy cases may be “settlement” cases, but even to
negotiate a settlement, litigants need to have a handle on the evidence
available to pursue a claim or defense. If produced materials may be
“clawed back” at any time, both sides may legitimately feel hampered in
their trial preparation by uncertainty as to which produced materials will
ultimately be “off-limits.” Such uncertainty may undermine the perceived
viability of a 502(d) order.
In Luna Gaming-San Diego L.L.C. v. Dorsey & Whitney, L.L.P.,106 the
parties entered into a protective order, approved by a magistrate judge,
providing for nonwaiver as a result of disclosure and allowing the parties to
clawback any inadvertently produced privileged documents.107 The agreedupon order did not specify the procedures to be utilized in exercising the
right to clawback privileged documents, however. Following disclosure,
plaintiff failed to object to defendant’s use of privileged materials during
one deposition and failed to follow up and demand return of privileged
materials after objecting to their use in a later deposition.108 Ultimately,
plaintiff failed to timely object to defendant’s use of privileged materials in

106. No. 06cv2804 BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).
107. Id. at *1.
108. Id.
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support of summary judgment motions.109 When plaintiff later objected to
the use of these materials, the district court found that plaintiff had waived
privilege—not by disclosing the materials—but by failing to object
promptly to their use by the other side.110 Although the court in Luna
Gaming arguably ignored the parties’ ability to trump the default rule found
in 502(b) by requiring prompt remedial action to reclaim privileged
material, its holding reflects the real concern that ill-defined agreements and
court orders may produce inefficiency and uncertainty that may impede the
resolution of disputes.
This potential barrier to the viability of 502(d) orders may best be
remedied through individual orders tailored to the needs of a particular case.
Committee notes to the above-proposed amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure could encourage judges to include deadlines and
procedures for “clawbacks” and “quick peeks” that require reasonably
prompt notification of a privilege or work product claim once the producing
party has “reason to know” of its disclosure of protected information. Such
a “reason-to-know” standard would not require a producing party to engage
in costly continuing review of its production. The standard would require
notification of privilege if the producing party independently discovers its
own privileged production or when the requesting party attempts to utilize a
previously produced privileged document during the pretrial phase. If the
requesting party attaches a produced document to a deposition, that party
should have some assurance that it will not be “clawed back” months later.
It would also be important to set an ultimate deadline for “clawbacks” and
“quick peeks,” either by agreement or otherwise. While a “reason-toknow” standard could generate some discovery disputes in and of itself,
providing some limit to prevent strategic misuse of the clawback
arrangement could ultimately foster greater acceptance of Rule 502(e)
agreements and 502(d) orders. Further, publication of model 502(d) orders,
such as the one produced by this Symposium, may serve as important
guidance to litigants and judges seeking to utilize this method to manage
discovery.
4. The Document Dump
Some cases reflect concern that a Rule 502(d) order will not reduce ediscovery costs, but will simply shift the burdens of ESI review from the
producing party to the requesting party.111 Without the specter of privilege
109. Id. at *4.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Rajala v. McGuire Woods, No. 08-2638, 2010 WL 2949582-CM-DJW, at
*7 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010) (the plaintiff opposed a 502(d) order for this reason). The
foregoing impediments to the viability of Rule 502(d) are somewhat party neutral. In other
words, whether your client is the producing or requesting party, visibility and functionality
may be a concern. Some perceived impediments to the viability of quick-peek or clawback
arrangements are more party-specific and may be experienced depending on whether the
party is the producing or requesting party.
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waiver to motivate careful review, the producing parties in large-scale ESI
cases may dump voluminous materials of limited relevance on requesting
parties. This could be done strategically to create settlement leverage or
simply as a cost-saving measure. Such concerns are most likely to arise in
cases involving individual litigants with little ESI to produce suing
organizational actors with significant amounts of potentially relevant ESI.
This perceived cost-shifting potential for a 502(d) order may act as an
additional barrier to conceptual change.112
Concerns about ESI dumping should not operate as an obstacle to greater
use of Rule 502(d) orders, however. First, party agreement is unnecessary
and a trial judge may institute 502(d) protection over a requesting party’s
objection.113 Should a requesting party voice legitimate concerns about ESI
dumping, the trial judge can utilize phased discovery to require targeted and
sequential productions that are manageable.114 Further, judges have
inherent and enumerated sanctioning power to prevent and punish genuine
abuse.115 To the extent that requesting parties fear excessive production of
materials under a 502(d) order, such fear could drive greater care in crafting
proportional discovery requests. If the presence of a 502(d) order leads to
more targeted discovery requests, this represents an added benefit of such
orders and promises to further reduce discovery costs by narrowing the field
of responsive ESI requiring review in the first place. Indeed, there has been
some discussion in the ESI era of adding greater proportionality limits on
the scope of discovery and explicit cost-shifting to curb tendencies to seek
broad, expansive discovery requiring search, review, and production of
voluminous ESI.116 Rule 502(d) may naturally create similar incentives for
the requesting party without express cost-shifting or proportionality limits.
If appropriately managed by the trial judge, therefore, the specter of
document dumping on the requesting party should not serve as a legitimate
obstacle to 502(d) orders.

112. See Jessica Wang, Nonwaiver Agreements After Federal Rule of Evidence 502: A
Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1848 (2009)
(noting concern that nonwaiver agreements “could potentially offload the cost to the other
party because the receiving party must spend its time reviewing the produced documents.”).
113. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
115. See GENSLER, supra note 14, at 576 (discussing the increasing judicial use of FRCP
26(g) sanctioning power to encourage litigants to “stop and think” about responsible
discovery practices); id. at 579 (discussing the judicial sanctioning power under FRCP 37
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, as well as “inherent powers”).
116. See Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules
of Civil Procedure, to Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice &
Procedure 9 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Reports/CV12-2011.pdf (noting that “[s]ome advantage might be found in
adding a proportionality limit to the broad scope provisions in Rule 26(b)(1) . . . . It also
might help to add explicit cost-shifting provisions . . .”).
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5. Fruit of the Poisonous 502 Tree
Another obstacle to the use of 502(d) to reduce privilege review costs is
concern that protection from waiver is inadequate to protect a client from
other negative consequences of sharing privileged information with an
adversary. A producing party utilizing technology-assisted privilege review
may be concerned that an opponent may glean helpful information or a
valuable strategic advantage simply from viewing privileged information
produced under a 502(d) order.117 Even if an opponent is barred from using
that privileged information, he may pursue other avenues of investigation
and argument revealed by the privileged documents that otherwise would
have remained unexplored. Without conducting an eyes-on privilege
review, producing parties fear that the risk associated with this possibility
will be unquantifiable until the litigation is resolved. Negative downstream
consequences may even flow to related litigation if an adversary develops a
viable strategy originating from privileged disclosures, but utilizing
nonprivileged information. As it stands, there is no clear derivative use
protection inherent in Rule 502 that could minimize such concerns.118 This
threat of derivative use of privileged information further impedes the
adoption of cost-effective electronic ESI review and the acceptance of the
Rule 502 self-help provisions by disclosing parties.119
There are two potential avenues to eliminating this obstacle to fuller use
of Rule 502(d). First, judges and litigants could attempt to craft derivative
use protection in individual 502(d) orders to prevent any strategic benefit to
a requesting party arising out of privileged disclosures.120 As discussed
during this Symposium, this protection could be akin to the “use immunity”
afforded criminal defendants in the context of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.121 While the government bears a
117. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 153 (noting the concern that a “litigant might be
harmed by an opposing party merely reading the information contained in a privileged
document.”); Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1554 (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.)
(noting that “possession of that [privileged] information by the adversary or by third parties
can generate additional discovery that would not have been done, additional claims that may
not have been made, additional problems that have to be resolved.”).
118. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1566 (comments of Professor Daniel J. Capra,
Moderator) (noting that “under the common law, it’s not absolutely clear that a recipient is
barred from using the fruits of privileged information.”).
119. Relatedly, a producing party may perceive that technology-assisted review merely
delays the cost of attorney review of a production, rather than truly eliminating that cost.
Because lawyers must review responsive documents at some point in the course of litigation
to develop strategies and arguments, some litigants may perceive inadequate cost savings to
justify risks of damaging disclosures to an adversary. Front-loading lawyer review for
privilege and strategy may seem preferable to producing without review only to conduct
such review later in the litigation. See id. at 1554–55 (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.).
120. See id. at 1567 (comments of Professor Daniel J. Capra, Moderator) (noting the
possibility of “prohibiting use of fruits in a 502(d) order”).
121. See United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441, 448–49 (1972) (preventing the
government from using information directly or indirectly derived from immunized
testimony); United States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that a
“‘common understanding’ of the term ‘use immunity’ has arisen ‘in the criminal justice
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“heavy burden” in the criminal context to prove that it has not used tainted
evidence to build its case, the recipient of privileged disclosures in a civil
context in which Rule 502(d) orders are most likely to be employed could
be required to make some lesser showing of independent development of
litigation strategies.122
This option appears unlikely to produce the certain protection necessary
to convert litigants to the use of technology-assisted privilege review and
threatens the efficiency objective of Rule 502, however. Constructing
meaningful protection for the producing party that preserves requesting
party opportunities to explore litigation strategies would be a drafting
challenge to say the least. Further, because of the difficulty in identifying
the source of litigation strategies with precision, derivative use protection
would certainly lead to contentious pretrial disputes. Added litigation over
the issue of derivative use creates costs and inefficiencies that run counter
to the goals of Rule 502(d) to streamline the discovery process through
greater party cooperation. Even more troubling, the incorporation of
derivative use protection into Rule 502(d) orders could facilitate the use of
privilege “as a sword” rather than “a shield.” Derivative use protection
would arm the disclosing party with a new argument to defeat trial
strategies of its adversary. As noted during discussion at the Symposium,
derivative use protection could lead to party abuse, with litigants
“inadvertently” revealing privileged information by design to invoke such
protection as a litigation tactic. Such aggressive use of privilege is at odds
with traditional privilege doctrine, as well as the goals of cooperation and
efficiency embodied in Rule 502. The potential prejudice to a requesting
party’s litigation position could further discourage party agreement to
clawback and quick-peek arrangements and increase the likelihood of
opposed motions for Rule 502(d) orders. In sum, constructing meaningful
and fair use protection to prevent adversarial benefit from privileged
disclosures appears somewhat unrealistic and fraught with peril.
The more promising alternative involves generating additional data to
minimize fear of privileged revelations arising out of technology-assisted
review. Lawyers maintain traditional review methodology because they
assume that human review produces more accurate results and reduces the
risk of unintended and damaging revelations to an adversary. This
perceived risk to the producing party will continue to impede conceptual
change in the area of privilege review absent evidence to the contrary.123
Reliable data regarding the accuracy of technology-assisted privilege
review could satisfy the second critical step in the conceptual change

world’ expanding the term to encompass derivative use immunity.”) (citing United States. v.
Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 1991)).
122. Although Rule 502 has application in the criminal context, the ability to use a 502(d)
order to minimize discovery costs is most salient in the civil context.
123. PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xviii (“Because this is nascent technology, there
is little research on how the accuracy of predictive coding compares with that of human
review.”).
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process by demonstrating a viable alternative to the existing privilege
review paradigm.
The studies that have compared human document review to electronic
review suggest that the “gold standard” of attorney review is a “myth.”124
To dismantle this myth once and for all and remove this obstacle to the
adoption of electronic review techniques, lawyers and clients need reliable
information regarding the actual risk of privileged revelations with the use
of computerized review methods. Although some studies have been
performed to pit the computer against the human reviewer, many of these
comparisons have involved review for responsiveness rather than privilege.
Importantly, however, these studies suggest that the accuracy of electronic
review promises to be superior, rather than inferior, to traditional eyes-on
review. If well-executed and highly publicized studies can be performed to
compare technology-assisted privilege review to lawyer privilege review,
they may similarly reveal fewer inadvertently disclosed privileged materials
in connection with electronic review.125 Research and education of this
kind will eventually lead to abandonment of the myth of the gold standard
of eyes-on privilege review. Once this is achieved, the specter of derivative
use of inadvertently produced privileged materials will no longer plague the
cost-effective technology-assisted review that Rule 502 aims to facilitate.
Therefore, the more direct and efficient answer to disclosing party concerns
regarding potential collateral use of disclosed privileged information
appears to be research and education regarding the actual error rate inherent
in electronic privilege review methodology. Should highly publicized
studies reveal the superiority of computerized privilege review, they would
generate dissatisfaction with the traditional model and unveil the existence
of a superior alternative to drive a full conceptual change with respect to ediscovery.126
CONCLUSION
To a large degree, lawyer resistance to minimizing privilege review
through the use of Rule 502 is simply a small piece of the larger struggle
toward greater cooperation in the discovery process. As one commentator
has noted:
At each stage, . . . the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] encourage—if
not require—cooperation and responsible behavior . . . . Despite these
124. Id. at xvii (noting studies documenting high rates of “human error” in page-by-page
review for relevance). See generally Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack,
Technology-Assisted Review in E-discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than
Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2011).
125. PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xvii.
126. One recent publication proposes that “the best way to overcome these barriers and
bring predictive coding into the mainstream is for innovative, public-spirited litigants to take
bold steps by using this technology for large-scale e-discovery efforts and to proclaim its use
in an open and transparent manner.” Id. at xix. Although organizational clients may engage
in a purposeful strategy to create a precedent that generates long-term cost-savings, taking
that bold first step may remain unrealistic in the absence of data about corresponding risks.
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clear signals about how lawyers should behave in discovery, complaints
about lack of cooperation, incivility, over-discovery, and obstructionism
are as common today as they were twenty-five years ago, perhaps even
more so.127

Litigators are zealous advocates. Indeed, some trial lawyers are sought
out due to their reputation for “scorched earth” litigation that treats an
opponent as the enemy and eschews all cooperation as a conscious strategy.
Although the discovery system requires greater collaboration and
cooperation to function efficiently, it is a component of an essentially
adversarial process. No amount of exhortation to get along is likely to
achieve genuine change in the relationship between opposing counsel.
Sanctions, on the other hand, may. Controlling counsels’ worst combative
tendencies through conferences, scheduling orders, and protective orders
will also minimize obstructionist behavior.
Time-honored, lucrative, and safe methods of eyes-on privilege review
present similar obstacles to change. Lawyers are unlikely to respond to
sermons about minimizing privilege review costs. To drive true conceptual
change and correspondingly drive down wasteful privilege review costs,
litigants will require concrete data, methods, and incentives to facilitate
movement in this direction. The ideas generated by this Symposium hold
great promise to remove existing obstacles to conceptual change. With
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bring visibility and
functionality to Rule 502, education in the form of draft 502(d) orders, and
the continuation of important research to quantify the degree of risk
involved in computerized review, litigants may be on their way to reduced
privilege review expenditures through Rule 502.

127. GENSLER, supra note 14, at 537.

